Abstract. In this paper, we give a security proof for Abreast-DM in terms of collision resistance and preimage resistance. As old as Tandem-DM, the compression function Abreast-DM is one of the most well-known constructions for double block length compression functions. The bounds on the number of queries for collision resistance and preimage resistance are given by O (2 n ). Based on a novel technique using query-response cycles, our security proof is simpler than those for MDC-2 and Tandem-DM. We also present a wide class of Abreast-DM variants that enjoy a birthday-type security guarantee with a simple proof.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function takes a message of arbitrary length, and returns a bit string of fixed length. The most common way of hashing variable length messages is to iterate a fixed-size compression function according to the Merkle-Damgård paradigm. The underlying compression function can either be constructed from scratch, or be built upon off-the-shelf cryptographic primitives such as blockciphers. Recently, the blockcipher-based construction is attracting renewed interest, as many dedicated hash functions, including those most common in practical applications, exhibit serious security weaknesses [1, 6, 14, 15, 20, [24] [25] [26] . Conveniently choosing an extensively studied blockcipher in the blockcipher-based construction, one can easily transfer the trust in the existing algorithm to the hash function. This approach is particularly useful in highly constrained environments such as RFID systems, since a single implementation of a blockcipher can be used for both a blockcipher and a hash function. Compared to blockciphers, the most dedicated hash functions require significant amounts of state and the operations in their designs are not hardware friendly [3] .
Compression functions based on blockciphers have been widely studied [2, 4, 8-11, 13, 16-19, 21-23] . The most common approach is to construct a 2n-to-n bit compression function using a single call to an n-bit blockcipher. However, such a function, called a single block length (SBL) compression function, might be vulnerable to collision attacks due to its short output length. For example, one could successfully mount a birthday attack on a compression function based on AES-128 using approximately 2 64 queries. This observation motivated substantial research on double block length (DBL) compression functions, where the output length is twice the block length of the underlying blockciphers.
Unfortunately, it turned out that a wide class of DBL compression functions of rate 1 are not optimally secure in terms of collision resistance and preimage resistance [8, 9, 12] . The most classical DBL compression functions of rate less than 1 include MDC-2, MDC-4, Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM [5, 13] . In 2007, 20 years after its original proposal, Steinberger first proved the collision resistance of MDC-2 in the ideal cipher model [23] . The author showed that an adversary asking less than 2 3n/5 queries has only a negligible chance of finding a collision. Motivated by this work, Fleischmann et. al. proved the security of Tandem-DM [7] . Similar to MDC-2, the security of Tandem-DM is estimated in terms of a parameter, say, α. Optimizing the parameter, they proved the collision resistance of Tandem-DM up to the birthday bound. Currently, Tandem-DM and the Hirose's scheme [11] are the only rate 1/2 DBL compression functions that are known to have a birthday-type security guarantee.
Results We give a security proof for Abreast-DM in terms of collision resistance and preimage resistance. As old as Tandem-DM, the compression function Abreast-DM is known to be more advantageous than Tandem-DM in that two encryptions involved can be computed in parallel. The bounds on the number of queries for collision resistance and preimage resistance are given by O (2 n ). Our security proof using certain cyclic structures, called query-response cycles, is much simpler than those for MDC-2 and Tandem-DM. The query-response cycle technique also allows us to present a wide class of Abreast-DM variants that enjoy a birthday-type security guarantee with a simple proof. It is shown that this class includes the Hirose's scheme [11] as a special case. We note, however, this technique does not apply directly to MDC-2 and Tandem-DM, since two encryptions in these compression functions are computed in serial and hence it is infeasible to define query-response cycles. The underlying blockcipher of Abreast-DM use 2n-bit keys, while MDC-2 accepts n-bit keys. For this reason, it seems to be natural that the security proof of MDC-2 is more challenging.
Preliminaries
General Notations For a positive integer n, we let I n = {0, 1}
n denote the set of all bitstrings of length n. For two bitstrings A and B, A|B and A denote the concatenation of A and B, and the bitwise complement of A, respectively. For a set U , we write u $ ← U to denote uniform random sampling from the set U and assignment to u.
Ideal Cipher Model For positive integers n and k, let
In the ideal cipher model, an (n, k)-blockcipher E is chosen from BC(n, k) uniformly at random. It allows for two types of oracle queries E(X, K) and E −1 (Y, K) for X, Y ∈ I n and K ∈ I k . Here, X, Y and K are called a plaintext, a ciphertext and a key, respectively. The response to an inverse query
The Abreast-DM Compression Function In the ideal cipher model, the Abreast-DM compression function
has oracle access to an ideal cipher E ∈ BC(n, 2n), and computes
n , by the algorithm described in Figure 1 .
Collision Resistance and Preimage Resistance Let F := F ABR be the Abreast-DM compression function based on an ideal blockcipher E ∈ BC(n, 2n), and let A be an informationtheoretic adversary with oracle access to E and E −1 . Then we execute the experiment Exp 
Informally, A Q B means that the query history Q determines the evaluation F : A → B. Now the collision-finding advantage of A is defined to be
The probability is taken over the random blockcipher E and A's coins (if any). For q > 0, we define Adv coll F (q) as the maximum of Adv coll F (A) over all adversaries A making at mostueries. The preimage resistance of F is quantified similarly using the experiment Exp 
For q > 0, Adv pre F (q) is the maximum of Adv pre F (A) over all adversaries A making at mostueries. The security definitions given in this section can be extended easily to any compression function built upon ideal primitives by appropriately defining the relation " Q ". ∆ = (Q 1 , . . . , Q 6 ) ∈ G is a cycle of length 6, then we have 
Property 3. For query-response cycles ∆ and ∆
Given an adversary A with oracle access to E and E −1 , one can transform A into an adversary B that records its query history in terms of query-response cycles. The modified adversary B is described in Figure 3 . We can easily check the following properties of B.
Property 4.
If A makes at mostueries, then the corresponding adversary B makes at most 6q queries, and records at mostuery-response cycles. 
Property 5. Adv

Security Results
Given Property 5, we will analyze the security of the Abreast-DM compression function with respect to the modified adversary B. We denote the query history of B by
where we write
Here we assume that query-response pair Q 
where E i ⇔ two evaluations from a single cycle ∆ i determines a collision,
Then it follows that
Algorithm B
Make queries for 
Return the response using query history Q∆ 
Proof. Inequality 1: First, assume that ∆ i consists of two distinct query-response pairs. A collision within this cycle implies that
Since the second query-response pair Q i 2 is obtained by a forward query, and Y 2 should be equal to Y 1 , the probability that this type of collision occurs is not greater than 1/N . Next, assume that ∆ i consists of six distinct query-response pairs. Suppose that, say,
3 determines a collision. With the notations in Property 2, it should be the case that
The probability that Y 2 and Y 3 satisfy these equations is not greater than (1/N ) 2 . The same argument applies to every pair of edges in ∆ i . Since the number of such pairs is 
and
The probability that such an event occurs is not greater than (1/N ) 2 .
Since each cycle contains at most 6 edges, we obtain Pr E i,j ≤ 36/ (N ) 2 .
By Lemma 1, equality (10) and Property 5, we obtain the following theorem. 
Let
The probability that such an event occurs is not greater than (1/N ) 2 . Since each cycle contains at most 6 edges, we obtain Pr E i ≤ 6/ (N ) 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, and the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let F
ABR be the compression function Abreast-DM and let q > 0. Then,
Abreast-DM Variants
In this section, we present a wide class of Abreast-DM variants that enjoy a birthday-type security guarantee. Let π be a permutation on I 
where A 2 , A 3 ). An Abreast-DM variant is illustrated in Figure 4 . By essentially the same argument as the previous section, we can prove the following theorem.
be the compression function defined in (13) , and let
If π contains no cycle of length 2, then In numerical terms with n = 128, any adversary asking less than 2 125.0 queries cannot find a collision with probability greater than 1/2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed collision resistance and preimage resistance of Abreast-DM with a novel technique using query-response cycles. As a result, we have shown that Abreast-DM is both collision resistant and preimage resistant up to O (2 n ) query complexity. With essentially the same proof as Abreast-DM, we also presented a wide class of Abreast-DM variants that enjoy a birthday-type security guarantee. We note that, however, our result for preimage resistance might not be optimal, since a truly random function with a 2n-bit output would require O 2 2n queries to find any preimage. For this reason, it will be an interesting further research to improve the security proof for premiage resistance.
